Journée-séminaire de combinatoire

(équipe CALIN du LIPN, université Paris-Nord, Villetaneuse)

Le 16 septembre 2025 à 14h00 en B107 & visioconférence, Élie de Panafieu nous parlera de : Probability that voting strategically is pointless

Résumé : "Strategic voting" or manipulability by coalition, occurs when a group of voters can obtain an election outcome they prefer by not voting sincerely. Among the various existing voting systems, Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) is reputed to be more resistant to strategic voting than others. IRV is used for several presidential and parliamentary elections around the world (Australia, India, Ireland, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka). We study the probability that strategic voting is ineffective under IRV when voters randomly draw their preferences among the candidates. This work combines social choice theory, probability, and analytic combinatorics.
Authors. François Durand, Élie de Panafieu, Guillem Perarnau (work in progress)

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